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Abstract. The contributions of this paper are new 6-round impossible-
diﬀerential (ID) and 9.75-round known-key distinguishers for the 3D
block cipher. The former was constructed using the miss-in-the-middle
technique, while the latter with an inside-out technique. These are the
largest ID and known-key distinguishers obtained for the 3D cipher so
far, based on the fact that complete diﬀusion is achieved after three
full rounds. Thus, we exploited the slow diﬀusion in 3D to attack the
largest possible number of rounds. The ID distinguishers lead to im-
proved attacks on 10-round variants of the 3D cipher, in the single-key
(non related-key) model. These results represent the currently best at-
tacks reported on reduced-round 3D cipher.
Keywords: impossible-diﬀerential cryptanalysis, known-key and
impossible-diﬀerential distinguishers, block ciphers.
1 Introduction
This paper presents new known-key and impossible-diﬀerential distinguishers,
as well as key-recovery attacks on reduced-round versions of the 3D block cipher
[17]. The impossible-diﬀerential technique was originally described in [13] and
applied to the DEAL block cipher. In [17], an ID attack was presented against
5.75 rounds of 3D (see Table 1), based on a 4.75-round distinguisher.
We describe new 6-round ID distinguishers for 3D, using the miss-in-the-
middle technique [4]. We further perform key-recovery attacks on up to 10
rounds. Table 1 summarizes the previous results and the attacks in this paper.
Known-key distinguishers were ﬁrst presented by Knudsen and Rijmen in [14].
We present new 7.75- and 9.75-round distinguishers for the 3D cipher, which
compares favorably when compared with the 7-round distinguisher found for
the AES.
This paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 brieﬂy describes the target cipher;
Sect. 3 describes new 6-round ID distinguishers for reduced-round 3D; Sect. 4
describes key-recovery attacks on reduced-round 3D; Sect. 5 describes known-key
distinguishers; Sect. 6 concludes this paper.
 This research was conducted while the author was aﬃliated to E´cole Polytechnique
Fe´de´rale de Lausanne, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland.
F. Bao and J. Weng (Eds.): ISPEC 2011, LNCS 6672, pp. 208–221, 2011.
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2 Brief Description of the 3D Cipher
The 3D block cipher operates on 512-bit blocks under a 512-bit user key, both
of which are represented as a 4×4×4 state of bytes [17]. The three-dimensional
cipher state, for a 64-byte data block A = (a0, a1, . . . , a63), is denoted
State =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
a0 a4 a8 a12
a1 a5 a9 a13
a2 a6 a10 a14
a3 a7 a11 a15
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a16 a20 a24 a28
a17 a21 a25 a29
a18 a22 a26 a30
a19 a23 a27 a31
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a32 a36 a40 a44
a33 a37 a41 a45
a34 a38 a42 a46
a35 a39 a43 a47
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a48 a52 a56 a60
a49 a53 a57 a61
a50 a54 a58 a62
a51 a55 a59 a63
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (1)
Bytes are ordered columnwise. The round subkeys follow this same ordering
and structure. We denote the ﬁrst byte of subkey ki as ki,0, the second byte as
ki,1, and so on. Each set of 16 bytes in a square is called a slice of the state.
In total, 3D iterates 22 rounds. The round transformations in 3D have a clear
correspondence with those of the AES [9]. Using the terminology of [17]:
– κi: bitwise xor with round subkey, equivalent to AddRoundKey in AES;
– γ: a bytewise S-box application, equivalent to SubBytes in AES;
– θ1, θ2: equivalent to ShiftRows in AES but applied to each slice of the state
alternately; θ1 in the odd-numbered rounds, θ2 in the even-numbered rounds;
– π: matrix multiplication with columns of the state, equivalent to MixColumns
in AES.
Each round transformation stands for a fraction of 0.25 (a quarter) of a round.
Thus, distinguishers may sometimes cover fractions of a round, such as 5.25
rounds, for instance. The key schedule of 3D follows a similar framework as
encryption. We refer to [17] for further details.
3 ID Distinguishers
The impossible diﬀerential (ID) technique was formerly described in [13]. To con-
struct thenew IDdistinguishers, truncateddiﬀerentials and themiss-in-the-middle
technique (MITM) [4] were used. The idea of the MITM approach is to concate-
nate two truncated diﬀerentials, say1, α
f→ β and  g← η, both of which hold with
certainty, into a single diﬀerentialα
g−1◦f→ η, where g−1◦f stands for the functional
composition of f and g−1 in this order. Nonetheless, β = , that is, the diﬀerences
do notmatch in themiddle of the distinguisher, whichmeans a contradiction2. Con-
sequently, α
g−1◦f→ η holds with probability zero, or analogously, α
g−1◦f
→ η holds
1 α
f→ β means that the diﬀerence α causes diﬀerence β after the transformation f
in the encryption (or forward) direction; 
g← η means that the diﬀerence η causes
diﬀerence  after the transformation g in the decryption (or backwards) direction. Note
the direction of the arrows.
2 For instance, a zero (byte) diﬀerence causes a nonzero (byte) diﬀerence (or vice-versa)
across a bijective S-box.
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with certainty. The terminologyα
g−1◦f
→ η means that α can never cause the diﬀer-
ence η across the transformations g−1◦f in the encryption direction. Analogously,
for the decryption direction. This set of diﬀerences α, β, , η characterize an ID
distinguisher constructed with the MITM technique. Once such distinguishers are
found, a key-recovery attack can be applied on a few additional rounds before or
after the distinguisher. Subkeys are guessed in the rounds before or after the distin-
guisher, and if they lead to diﬀerences α and η then they are wrong keys, because
they lead to a contradiction, the impossible diﬀerential. The ID attack is a sieving
technique: the correct key is recovered indirectly, by eliminating all the wrong keys
(the false alarms).
The ID technique has already been applied to many ciphers, including
IDEA and Khufu [4], Twoﬁsh [5], Rijndael [1,8], CRYPTON [8], Zodiac [12],
Hierocrypt-3 [7], TEA and XTEA [16], among others.
Unlike diﬀerential cryptanalysis (DC), where we only look for upperbounds on
the probability of characteristics or diﬀerentials, ID cryptanalysis rather ﬁnds
lowerbounds (with probability zero). Recall that ID also uses diﬀerentials, so
it is a kind of DC, as its name indicates. So, as Shamir mentioned3, it is not
enough anymore just to ﬁnd the highest probability diﬀerential to claim that a
cipher resists all kinds of DC attacks. Finding lowerbounds on the probability
of distinguishers is also very relevant, and this is aim of ID cryptanalysis.
In the distinguishers, the symbol ’Δ’ stands for a nonzero byte (xor) diﬀer-
ence, also called an active byte; the symbol ’0’ will stand for the zero byte (xor)
diﬀerence, also called a passive byte. The symbol ’?’ denotes either a zero or a
nonzero byte diﬀerence. Right/left arrows indicate diﬀerence propagation (with
certainty) in the encryption/decryption directions, respectively. Broken arrows
indicate impossible diﬀerence propagation. Labels on top of arrows indicate the
number of rounds or the round transformations between diﬀerence patterns.
Sometimes, π and κi layers will be swapped, leading to an equivalent subkey,
κ′i = π
−1(κi), since these transformations are linear. Composition of round trans-
formations is evaluated in right-to-left order both for encryption and decryption
operations. For example, for a given state x, π ◦ θ1 ◦ γ ◦κi(x) = π(θ1(γ(κi(x)))).
To simplify notation, instead of specifying every round transformation cov-
ered by a distinguisher, like α
g−1◦f→ η, we just mention the number of rounds
covered, such as α 3r→ η, meaning α causes η after three (full) rounds. The
distinguisher (2) combines two 3-round truncated diﬀerentials: α 3r→ β in the
encryption direction and  3r← η in the decryption direction, both holding with
certainty. Any placement of the single byte diﬀerence in α among the 64 byte
positions in the state leads to an equivalent distinguisher. Analogously, there are
64 alternative diﬀerence patterns for η, leading to 64 other 6-round ID distin-
guishers. Thus, in total, we have 642 = 212 6-round ID distinguishers following
the framework of (2). In summary, a single-byte diﬀerence (in any position) in
the state cannot cause a single-byte diﬀerence after 6-round 3D.
3 See Adi Shamir’s talk at the Rump Session of Crypto’98:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible diﬀerential cryptanalysis
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The concatenation of α 3r→ β and  3r← η results in α
6r
→ η because of a
contradiction between the diﬀerence patterns in β and  after the third π layer.
Before and after this π layer there is a single Δ byte diﬀerence in every column.
This pattern contradicts the branch number of π which is 5. Contradictions can
also be identiﬁed in other places along the 6-round distinguisher by extending the
two truncated diﬀerentials. The same holds in the opposite direction: α
6r
← η,
which might be relevant for attacks in a chosen-ciphertext (CC) setting (see
Appendix A).
The rationale for the construction of (2) is the fact that complete diﬀusion in
the 3D cipher requires three full rounds. Note that (2) consists of two truncated
diﬀerentials, both starting with a single Δ byte and propagating undisturbed
until complete diﬀusion is (almost) achieved.
Unlike conventional ID distinguishers, (2) and (3) have low Hamming weight
both for α and for η, concerning byte diﬀerences, that is, there are too many
zero byte diﬀerences in α and η. This fact makes the new distinguishers inne-
fective in attacks like [4,6]. Rather, we use the technique in [1] to accomplish
key-recovery attacks. These new constructions compare favorably with the ID
distinguisher described in [17], in which the Hamming weight of the input and
output diﬀerences was signiﬁcantly higher.
α =
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π◦θ1◦γ◦κi−→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
θ2◦γ◦κi+1−→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
θ1◦γ◦κi+2−→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
π
→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
⎞
⎟⎠
κi+3◦γ−1◦θ−12←
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π
−1
←
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 Δ 0 0
0 0 Δ 0
0 0 0 Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
κi+4◦γ−1◦θ−11←
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
π−1◦κi+5◦γ−1◦θ−12 ◦κi+6←
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ = η
(2)
Note that (2) starts from a round using θ1. Since 3D contains two kinds of
byte permutation, θ1 and θ2, an equivalent 6-round ID distinguisher is presented
in (3), for attacks starting with θ2.
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α′ =
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π◦θ2◦γ◦κi→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
θ1◦γ◦κi+1→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
θ2◦γ◦κi+2→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
θ1◦γ◦κi+3◦π→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
⎞
⎟⎠
π−1
←
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
κi+4◦γ−1◦θ−12←
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
π−1◦κi+5◦γ−1◦θ−11 ◦κi+6←
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ = η′
(3)
4 ID Attack on 10-Round 3D
We describe a key-recovery attack on 10-round 3D by placing (2) in the third
round (or any other round farther as long as it uses θ1) and recovering subkey bits
from k0, k1, k9 and k10. The attack framework is depicted in (4), where ’*’ means
byte positions that have to be known to allow partial encryption/decryption,
such as text and subkey bytes.
⎛
⎜⎝
∗ 0 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0
0 0 ∗ 0
0 0 0 ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∗ 0 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0
0 0 ∗ 0
0 0 0 ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∗ 0 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0
0 0 ∗ 0
0 0 0 ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∗ 0 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0
0 0 ∗ 0
0 0 0 ∗
⎞
⎟⎠ θ1◦γ◦κ0→
⎛
⎜⎝
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π→
⎛
⎜⎝
∗ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ θ2◦γ◦κ1→
⎛
⎜⎝
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
π→ 6-round ID distinguisher π
−1
←
⎛
⎜⎝
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∗ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
γ−1◦θ−11←
⎛
⎜⎝
∗ 0 0 0
0 0 0 ∗
0 0 ∗ 0
0 ∗ 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π
−1◦κ9←
⎛
⎜⎝
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
γ−1◦θ−12 ◦κ10←
⎛
⎜⎝
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
⎞
⎟⎠
(4)
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The attack steps are the following:
(a) consider 2n structures, each of which contains 2128 plaintexts, with all possi-
ble values in diagonal positions of the plaintext state according to (1). That
means bytes in positions 0, 5, 10, 15, 16, 21, 26, 31, 32, 37, 42, 47, 48, 53, 58
and 63 of the plaintext state, and ﬁxed values for the remaining bytes. This
means about 2255 text pairs per structure, and 2n+128 plaintexts in total. Re-
quest the 10-round encryption of the 2n+128 plaintexts (from the 1st round).
Filter the ciphertext pairs that have zero byte diﬀerences in the 48 ciphertext
positions marked with ’0’ in (4). It is expected that 2n+255(2−8)48 = 2n−129
pairs will satisfy this condition.
(b) guess the twenty subkey bytes k10,0, k10,4, k10,8, k10,12, k10,17, k10,21, k10,25,
k10,29, k10,34, k10,38, k10,42, k10,46, k10,51, k10,55, k10,59, k10,63, k9,0, k9,13,
k9,10, k9,7, and partially decrypt π−1 ◦ γ−1 ◦ θ−11 ◦ π−1 ◦ κ9 ◦ γ−1 ◦ θ−12 ◦
κ10 until one end of the distinguisher. For the transition from the last to
the penultimate round, choose text pairs that lead to a single active byte
in the leftmost column of each slice, as shown in (4). This is expected to
happen with probability (2−24)4 = 2−96. Thus, the number of pairs becomes
2n−129−96 = 2n−225. Further, choose among the surviving pairs those whose
diﬀerence is nonzero in a single byte in the leftmost column of the state,
as in the output diﬀerence of (2), after the partial 2-round decryption. The
probability of such a diﬀerence is (2−8)3 · 4 = 2−22 since the active byte can
be in any position in the column.
(c) guess the twenty subkey bytes k0,0, k0,5, k0,10, k0,15, k0,16, k0,21, k0,26, k0,31,
k0,32, k0,37, k0,42, k0,47, k0,48, k0,53, k0,58, k0,63, k1,0, k1,17, k1,34, k1,51, and
partially encrypt π ◦ θ2 ◦ γ ◦ κ1 ◦ π ◦ θ1 ◦ γ ◦ κ0. In the transition from the 1st
to the 2nd round, chose those pairs that lead to the diﬀerence pattern with
a single active byte in each column of the ﬁrst slice, as shown in (4). This is
expected to happen with probability (2−24)4 = 2−96. Thus, the number of
pairs becomes 2n−225−96 = 2n−321. Further, with probability 4 ·2−24 = 2−22,
we expect to get zero diﬀerence in three out of the four byte positions in a
column, as in the input diﬀerence of (2), after the 2-round partial encryption.
Each text pair deﬁnes a set of wrong 40-byte subkeys. The number of surviving
wrong subkeys is 240·8(1−2−22·2)2n−321 = 2320(1−2−44)2n−321 . Using n > 372.79,
no wrong subkeys remain. This implies 2373+128 = 2501 chosen plaintexts (CP).
In step (a), the adversary requests the encryption of chosen plaintexts to the
legitimate users, since he does not know the key. Thus, there is no computa-
tional eﬀort for the adversary in this step. The complexity of step (b) consists
of partial 2-round decryption for each subkey guess and valid pair, which means
2n−129 · 2064 · 2160 · 2 = 5 · 2n+28 2-round computations, since roughly 20 bytes out
of the 64 in a round are computed. For n = 373, this corresponds to 5 · 2401/5 =
2401 10-round computations. In step (c), 2n−225 pairs are analyzed, and for
each guess of 20 subkey bytes, two rounds are partially encrypted. This mean
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2n−225 · 2064 · 2160 · 2 = 5 · 2n−69 2-round computations. For n = 373, the ef-
fort is equivalent to 5 · 2304/5 = 2304 10-round computations. Overall, the time
complexity is 2401 10-round computation.
To keep track of wrong 40-byte subkeys, a storage of 240·8/512 = 2311 blocks is
used. To recover the rest of the key, the same attack can be repeated but only for
the remaining bytes of k9 and k10 using the same plaintexts. Thus, no additional
chosen plaintexts will be needed. This way, less subkeys are recovered at a time
and this residual complexity will not aﬀect the overall time complexity. Once one
full 512-bit round subkey is recovered, the original user key can be reconstructed
at once, using the key schedule of 3D [17].
5 Known-Key Distinguishers
In this section, we apply the ideas from [14] to reduced-round 3D, due to sim-
ilarities with the AES. Note that a known-key distinguisher is derived from an
inside-out technique, in contrast to an impossible-diﬀerential which typically
uses the miss-in-the-middle or an outside-in technique. Thus, these distinguish-
ers exploit diﬀerentials in opposite directions.
We follow the terminology of multiset or integral attacks, where ’A’ stands
for an active byte, ’P ’ stands for a passive byte, ’B’ stands for a balanced byte,
and ’?’ stands for a non-balanced byte [10]. The propagation and transformation
of diﬀerent word bytes in a multiset is the same as in SQUARE [10] and AES
ciphers, and is a consequence of the fact that wordwise operations in 3D are
neatly performed bytewise.
We start with a single ’A’ byte in the ith round, in the middle of a state
(while the remaining 63 bytes are ’P ’). Across 4.25 rounds in the encryption
direction, this distinguisher propagates undisturbed (i.e it holds with certainty),
ending with 64 ’B’ bytes (5). After 4.25 rounds, there is a γ layer, and all bytes
become ’?’. In the decryption direction, again starting from the ith round and
propagating freely, we arrive at a state with only ’B’ bytes after 3.75 rounds: the
upper part of (5). These two pieces form a 7.75-round known-key distinguisher
holding with certainty. Similar distinguishers can be obtained if the single ’A’
byte was in any of the other 63 position of the ith round in the state. This
known-key distinguisher lead to an attack costing 28 CP. The time complexity
is only 28 encryptions and the memory is negligible.
Just like in the ID distinguisher case, we exploited full diﬀusion of 3D in both
the encryption and decryption directions at once in the distinguisher (5). Note
the direction of arrows between round transitions. But, unlike the ID case, in
the multiset case the ’A’ words become ’B’ before turning into ’?’ after about
one round, giving almost an additional round at both ends of the distinguisher.
A fundamental assumption for this attack is that the key is known. The at-
tack starts with a single ’A’ byte in the middle of 7.75-round 3D cipher. The
outcome of the attack is veriﬁed by checking if all bytes (at both ends of the
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distinguisher) are balanced, which means the xor sum is zero in 512 bits of
plaintext and ciphertext’s multisets. This assumption may be justiﬁed in a hash
function setting where the key input is the message input and is under control of
an adversary. Nonetheless, the relevance of known-key attacks on r-round 3D is
that, for instance, r-round 3D does not behave ideally that is, cannot be modeled
as a random permutation. In particular, for (5), the zero xor-sum is expected to
happen with probability 2−512 for a random permutation, but in 7.75-round 3D
cipher, the xor-sum is always zero for any (known) key.
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ
−1
1 ◦π
−1◦κi−3◦γ−1◦θ−12←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
P A P P
P P A P
P P P A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
P A P P
P P A P
P P P A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
P A P P
P P A P
P P P A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
P A P P
P P A P
P P P A
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi−2◦γ−1◦θ−11←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
A P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
A P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
A P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi−1◦γ−1◦θ−12←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π◦θ1◦γ◦κi−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ2◦γ◦κi+1−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
A P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
A P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ1◦γ◦κi+2−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
P P P A
P P A P
P A P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
P P P A
P P A P
P A P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
P P P A
P P A P
P A P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A P P P
P P P A
P P A P
P A P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi+4◦π◦θ2◦γ◦κi+3−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
(5)
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Analogously, if the forward part (in the encryption direction) started from
an odd-numbered round, that is, with θ2, instead of θ1, then we would obtain a
similar 7.75-round distinguisher, (6).
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ
−1
1 ◦π
−1◦κi−3◦γ−1◦θ−11←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A A A A
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
A A A A
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
A A A A
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
A A A A
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi−2◦γ−1◦θ−12←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
P A P P
P P A P
P P P A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi−1◦γ−1◦θ−11←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π◦θ2◦γ◦κi−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
A P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ1◦γ◦κi+1−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A P P P
P P P A
P P A P
P A P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ2◦γ◦κi+2−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A A A A
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
A A A A
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
A A A A
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi+4◦π◦θ1◦γ◦κi+3−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
(6)
Using higher-order multisets, denoted by four A∗, or more precisely, four bytes
as a single active 32-bit word, as done in [14] for the AES, we obtain the multiset
distinguishers (7) and (8) in the encryption and decryption directions, respec-
tively.
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⎛
⎜⎜⎝
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ
−1
2 ◦π
−1◦κi−4◦γ−1◦θ−11←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi−3◦γ−1◦θ−12←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
P A∗ P P
P P A∗ P
P P P A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
P A∗ P P
P P A∗ P
P P P A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
P A∗ P P
P P A∗ P
P P P A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
P A∗ P P
P P A∗ P
P P P A∗
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi−2◦γ−1◦θ−11←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−1←
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
A∗ P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
A∗ P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
A∗ P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi−1◦γ−1◦θ−12 ◦π
−1
←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
(7)
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
P A∗ P P
P P A∗ P
P P P A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π◦θ1◦γ◦κi−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ2◦γ◦κi+1−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
A∗ P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
A∗ P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
A∗ P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ1◦γ◦κi+2−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
P P P A∗
P P A∗ P
P A∗ P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
P P P A∗
P P A∗ P
P A∗ P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ P P P
P P P A∗
P P A∗ P
P A∗ P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P A∗
P P A∗ P
P A∗ P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
π→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ2◦γ◦κi+3−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗4 A∗4 A∗4 A∗4
A∗1 A∗1 A∗1 A∗1
A∗2 A∗2 A∗2 A∗2
A∗3 A∗3 A∗3 A∗3
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
θ1◦γ◦κi+4◦π−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
κi+5◦π−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
(8)
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Analogous to [14], the 5.25-round forward and 4.5-round backward multisets
(7) and (8) can be combined over 9.75-round 3D. We construct a structure of
2(4+3)∗8 = 256 CP which diﬀer in the seven bytes depicted in (9), and constant
bytes in the remaining positions of the state. This can be viewed as a collection
of 224 copies of the forward multiset, or a collection of 224 copies of the backward
multiset. Combining both multisets, exactly as in [14], one records the frequencies
in each byte of plaintext and ciphertext and checks if the values in each byte of
plaintext and ciphertext of a 232 multiset is balanced (zeroxor sum). The time
complexity is 256 9.75-round encryptions, 256 CP and small memory (just to
keep track if the xor sum is zero).
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
4.5 rounds←−
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
A∗ P P P
A∗ A∗ P P
A∗ P A∗ P
A∗ P P A∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
P P P P
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
5.25 rounds−→
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
(9)
6 Conclusions
This paper presented new known-key and ID distinguishers for the 3D block ci-
pher [17], along with distinguishing and key-recovery attacks. These distinguish-
ers cover more rounds than any previously reported one, and allow to perform
better attacks on reduced-round versions of the 3D cipher, either starting from
an odd-numbered or an even-numbered round, depending on the use of θ1 or θ2
transformations.
The ID attacks were possible due to new ideas in [1] using ID distinguishers
α
6r
→ η with low Hamming weight of byte diﬀerences, for both α and η. Tradi-
tional ID attacks, such as [4] could not proﬁt from these new ID distinguishers
because there would be not enough pairs surviving the ﬁltering due to the large
number of zero byte diﬀerences in η.
Known-key distinguishers covering 7.75 and 9.75 rounds of 3D were described
in Sect. 5. The impact of known-key attacks on reduced-round 3D is, for instance,
to show that r-round 3D does not behave as an ideal cryptographic primitive,
such as a random function or random permutation in settings where the key
input is under the control of the adversary, such as in hash functions.
Table 1 lists the complexities of previous and new attacks described in this
paper. A distinguishing-from-random ID attack on 6-round 3D is described in
the appendix. The attacks detailed in this paper are the currently best ones
on reduced-round versions the 3D block cipher in the single-key model, even
though the attack complexities are not practical. Also, although our attacks
reach almost double the numbers of rounds of previous analyses [17], they do
not threaten the full 22-round 3D cipher. The security margin is still high. A
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Table 1. Attack complexities on reduced-round 3D cipher
Attack Time Data Memory #Rounds Source
Multiset 219.5 29 CP 28 4.75 [17]
ID 265.5 236 CP 232 5.75 [17]
Multiset 2139 2129 CP 2128 5.75 [17]
ID 2256 2256 CC 2256 6 appendix A
Known-key 28 28 CP negligible 7.75 see (5)
Known-key 256 256 CP negligible 9.75 see (9)
ID 2401 2501 CP 2311 10 see (4)
Time complexity in number of encryptions; memory complexity in number of text
blocks
CP: Chosen Plaintext; CC: Chosen Ciphertext
promising future research direction is to apply related-key attacks on 3D or
reduced-round versions, due to the similarity between 3D and the AES.
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A A Distinguishing Attack
We slightly change (2) so that the diﬀerence pattern in η contains thirty-two Δ
bytes, and call this 6-round ID distinguisher (10). This CC attack is motivated
by the fact that α → η if and only if η → α.
α =
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π◦θ1◦γ◦κi→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
θ2◦γ◦κi+1→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
Δ 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
θ1◦γ◦κi+2→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ 0 0 0
0 0 0 Δ
0 0 Δ 0
0 Δ 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠ π→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
⎞
⎟⎠
θ2◦γ◦κi+3→
⎛
⎜⎝
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
⎞
⎟⎠
π
→
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
⎞
⎟⎠
κi+4◦γ−1◦θ−11 ◦π
−1
←
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
⎞
⎟⎠
κi+5◦γ−1◦θ−12 ◦κi+6←
⎛
⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Δ Δ Δ Δ
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Δ Δ Δ Δ
⎞
⎟⎠ = η
(10)
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The distinguisher (10) can be used in a chosen-ciphertext (CC) setting, for
instance, to distinguish 6-round 3D (or a dual cipher [2]) from a random permu-
tation. The procedure is the following:
(i) choose (28)32 = 2256 ciphertexts Ci, whose bytes in the thirty-two Δ bytes
diﬀerences in the ciphertext pattern assume all possible 256-bit values,
while the remaining bytes are (arbitrary) constants;
(ii) request the decryption of the Ci’s across six rounds, and store the corre-
sponding plaintexts Pi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 2256 − 1;
(iii) form 2256(2256 − 1)/2 ≈ 2511 pairs Pi ⊕ Pj , i = j;
(iv) if no pair Pi ⊕ Pj has a single nonzero byte diﬀerence, then the cipher is
identiﬁed as 6-round 3D (or a dual cipher); otherwise, it is considered a
random permutation. There are 64 possible positions for the single nonzero
byte diﬀerence in the plaintext state. Thus, the joint probability of these
plaintext diﬀerence patterns is 64 · (2−8)63 = 26−504 = 2−498. There is
a chance of 2−498 that a single-byte diﬀerence in any of the 64 state po-
sitions in (10) is satisﬁed by a random permutation. Thus, 1 − 2−498 is
the probability that it is not satisﬁed by a single pair. For t pairs, the
probability that the diﬀerence pattern does not appears in a random per-
mutation is (1 − 2−498)t ≈ e−t/2498 . Using t = 2511 pairs there is a chance
of 1/e8192 ≈ 2−11818 that the output diﬀerence of (10) does not appears in
a random permutation.
There is no shortage of pairs for this attack. For a random permutation, the
2511 pairs lead to about 2511 ·2−498 = 213 pairs potentially satisfying a plaintext
diﬀerence pattern with a single nonzero byte diﬀerence. This distinguishing at-
tack costs 2256 6-round decryptions, 2256 chosen ciphertexts (CC) and equivalent
memory.
